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The effect of Unemployment (UI) on Unemployment Duration (UD) is widely 
investigated with job search theory, which tells that the possibility of transiting from 
unemployment to employment is determined by two factors—job arrival rate and the 
possibility of accepting the job offer. Some economists think that UI reduces the search 
cost and income loss for unemployed workers, which increases the reservation wage and 
lengths their UDs. While some economists think that UI can support job search and 
increase the job arrival rate as well. This makes its impact on UD ambiguous. 
 
The theoretical framework of this paper is based on Mortensen (1986). In Mortensen's 
model, search cost is exogenously determined and does not change over time and the job 
offer arrival rate is fixed. This paper assumes that job arrival rate is positively correlated 
with search cost and that unemployed workers can choose their search cost to maximize 
their value of unemployment. The individual asset is used as a proxy for financial 
resources and introduced into budget constraint. The theoretical model shows the 
possibility that the effect of UI on UD varies with the individual asset. For unemployed 
workers with limited asset the effect of UI on transition from unemployment to 
employment is positive; for unemployed worker whose asset is over certain amount, the 
effect becomes negative. It is assumed that value of leisure is positively correlated with 
individual asset, and inferred that the transition rate from unemployment to employment 
first increases with asset but then decreases. 
 
IV 
 The theoretical predictions are tested using both parametric and semi-parametric survival 
models. Using the U.S. National Longitude Survey of Youth 1979, I find that UI can 
reduce UD for poor unemployed workers. The empirical results are not sensitive to semi-
parametric and parametric analysis, which implies that the empirical result is robust. In 
addition, the results of this paper suggest that poor unemployed workers should be given 
more subsidies to help job search and UI benefits for rich unemployed workers should be 
taxed to reduce their UD. 
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The effect of unemployment insurance (UI) on unemployment duration (UD) has been 
widely investigated in the past 30 years. One of the most commonly used models to 
analyze the impact of UI on UD is job search theory, where the probability of 
reemployment is influenced by two factors: (1) the job arrival rate and (2) the possibility 
of accepting the offer. The evolution of job search theory has had a profound impact on 
labor market transition analysis. The theory provides economists with an analytical tool 
to explore rational individual behavior during unemployment. The theoretical 
contributions have greatly influenced empirical work on unemployment in general, and 
microeconometric work on unemployment duration in particular.  
 
Many researchers focus on the possibility of accepting the offer. Mortensen (1970, 1977) 
points out that UI would reduce the search cost and income lose of unemployed worker, 
which increases the expected return from job search and the reservation wage1 and hence 
lengthens UD. In addition, many previous empirical studies find that UI prolongs UD.  
Reviewing some micro-data studies in the US, Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) 
[p.992] find a positive relationship between UI and UD which “appears robust”. 
Lancaster and Nickell (1980) find that the elasticity of unemployment duration with 
respect to unemployment benefits is about 0.6, which means that a 10 percent rise in 
benefits will be associated with a one week rise in UD if the duration is 17 weeks. These 
                                                 
1 Reservation wage means the minimum wage rate of job offer at which unemployed worker is willing to 
accept the job offer. 
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estimations suggest that only quite large cuts in benefits could raise outflows sufficiently 
to reduce unemployment by a substantial amount.  
 
Most of the papers ignore the potential impact of UI on the job arrival rate. The job 
arrival rate depends not only on the labor demand in particular labor market and personal 
characteristics, but also on the job search effort. Maki and Spindler (1975) point out that 
increases in unemployment benefits will induce a greater search activity. Wadsworth 
(1991) shows that the unemployment benefits indeed have a positive effect on job search 
activities and reduce UD. Using UK Labor Force Survey data, he estimates search effort 
equations conditional on the decision to look for jobs. After controlling for potential 
selectivity bias, personal characteristics and demand conditions, he finds that unemployed 
workers with UI benefits search more extensively than Non-UI receivers, thereby 
increasing the job arrival rate. 
 
The findings of these papers have important implications for the study of impact of UI on 
UD. If UI benefits help individuals to search more intensively and increase the job arrival 
rate, the effect of UI on expected UD is ambiguous. This paper attempts to examine both 
theoretical and empirical link between UI on UD and suggests that the impact of search 
cost on job arrival rate should be considered when investigating the impact of UI on UD. 
In the next section, the theoretical framework is introduced, which first reviews the 
previous findings, then briefly describes Mortensen’s model (1986) and extends the 
model by adding some assumptions. Section 3 develops the empirical model. Section 4 
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discusses the data source. Section 5 reports the estimation results. Section 6 provides 






2.1 Literature Review 
 
Job search theory is one of the most recently and frequently used models in analyzing the 
transition from unemployment to employment. It provides a framework to investigate the 
problems of transition and is used to analyze the impact of UI on UD in this paper.  
 
 In the standard job search model, the job arrival rate and distribution of offered wages 
are exogenously determined and the strategy of the unemployed worker is to choose an 
optimal reservation wage. This theory says that for UI receivers, an increase in the 
benefits rate lowers cost of search and increases the reservation wage, resulting in longer 
expected duration of unemployment. Mortensen (1977, 1986) derives several strong 
results using a model of sequential search where he incorporates some institutional 
features of labor markets, such as a fixed duration of benefits payments and an eligibility 
requirement that a certain amount of work experience must precede insured 
unemployment. The wage-offer distribution is taken as stationary and known by job 
seekers. He concludes that for unemployed workers who are eligible for benefits, a rise in 
the benefits level will cause them to increase their reservation wage; but when it is close 
to benefits exhaustion, the insured workers will reduce their reservation wage. The exit 
rate is thus lower for newly unemployed workers but higher for workers whose benefits 
are close to exhaustion.  
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Ham and Rea (1987) apply a discrete-time-duration model to Canadian microeconomic 
data to examine the effect of UI onUD. They control for the UI benefits duration  and 
demand conditions to examine their impacts on the probability of leaving unemployment. 
Their result indicates that the UI benefits duration has a significant effect on 
unemployment duration, even for those who do not ultimately exhaust their benefits. If 
UI benefits duration is fixed, the probability of leaving unemployment declines with 
duration of unemployment. When UI benefits duration is added into the model, the 
probability of leaving unemployment first falls and then generally rises with 
unemployment duration. Within the context of the search model, a decline in UI benefits 
duration induces a greater willingness to accept offers or to search more intensively. If 
transition rate is the same for UI receivers and Non-UI receivers after UI expires, the 
expected UD will be longer for UI receivers than for Non-UI receivers.   
 
Meyer (1990) tests the effects of the level and length of UI benefits on unemployment 
duration. The paper particularly studies individual behavior during the weeks just prior to 
when benefits lapse and find that transition rate rises dramatically just prior to when 
benefits lapse. When UI benefits duration is extended, the probability of a spell ending is 
high in the week when benefits were previously expected to expire.  The author also finds 
that higher UI benefits have a strong negative effect on the probability of leaving 
unemployment. 
 
At the same time, many economists explore the incentive effect of UI on transition. 
Tannery (1983) says that if time spent and market expenditures are complementary inputs 
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in job search the total effect of UI may be ambiguous. The author bases his theory on the 
Barron and Mellow (1979). One of the more interesting features of the theoretical 
framework developed by Barron and Mellow (1979) is that job seekers are assumed to 
choose their input of time and expenditures to affect the job arrival rate in any period. 
However, Barron and Mellow assume that these inputs of time and market goods are 
combined to determine job arrival rate separately—the level of market expenditures does 
not affect the marginal productivity of search time. Barron and Mellow show that search 
effort decreases with the increase in reservation wages, which is caused by UI benefits. 
Tannery (1983) shows how relaxing this assumption alters the basic prediction from 
Barron and Mellow (1979). He assumes a more general function for job arrival rate, 
indicating that search expenditures and search time are complementary inputs. If this is 
the case, increases in income will result in search expenditure increase, which will raise 
the productivity of time spent in search and induce greater search efforts. Then a priori 
potential for UI benefits to encourage search effort is expanded because UI might 
encourage unemployed worker to allocate greater search expenditure on search activities. 
He uses empirical result to confirm that after taking the complimentary relationship 
between time devoted to job search and search cost into consideration, UI has positive 
effect on job transition, which casts some doubt on Barron and Mellow’s conclusion. 
 
Similarly if there are binding restrictions on the capacity of unemployed workers to 
borrow to finance search activity, UI would possibly increase the resources devoted to 
search and hence increase the probability of return to work. Ben-Horim and Zuckerman 
(1987) show that for individuals with limited private resources for search purposes, UI 
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benefits could decrease the expected UD. They add search cost into the job distribution 
and define the distribution function of the highest wage offer received over each period 
as , where c is the periodic search cost. An increase in the search cost causes a 
stochastic increase in the number of offers received per period. Therefore, they assume 
that is an increasing function of c. In addition, they make search intensity 
endogenously determined—the individual choose how much financial resources are used 
for job search to maximize the expected return from search. Under these assumptions, 
they find that for unemployed workers with limited financial resources, UI benefits can 
reduce the expected UD. In addition, they give an example to show that there exists such 
a possibility. Their example shows that when the highest possible wage offer is large 




Kahn and Low (1988) have considered types of search, as opposed to search intensity. In 
their search model, unemployed workers are seen as choosing between systematic search, 
which involves collecting information on the wages offered by specific search, and 
random search where job searcher elicits offers from a distribution that is known a priori 
but the searcher is ignorant of the particular offer that any firm will make. Previous 
theoretical models of job search assume either that the searcher has no firm-specific 
information and thus searches randomly or that the searcher has firm-specific knowledge 
and choose which firms to contact. Kahn and Low build and test a theoretical model that 
involves both systematic search and random search. In their model, job seeker can 
produce firm-specific knowledge which can be productively used in looking for a new 
job. Systematic search is assumed to be costly in both time and money but is more likely 
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to lead to an acceptable wage offer. UI benefits increase the financial resources of job 
seekers, hence increase the likelihood of producing firm-specific information and search 
systematically. Using the 1976 US Current Population Survey (CPS) data, they find that 
offers are more likely to be rejected in random search strategy than under systematic 
search and UI does subsidize systematic search. Kahn and Low’s model of systematic 
search shows that UI encourages unemployed workers to structure job search so that the 
job seeker contacts firms, which leads to higher possibility of finding a job. Therefore UI 
can reduce the expected UD. 
 
Hughes, Peoples and Perlman (1996) compare the transition of unemployment between 
high-income and low-income group to exam whether the UI benefits help unemployed 
workers to find jobs more efficiently. Their paper assumes that the high-income group 
and low-income group are faced with different labor market. For unemployed workers in 
low-income group, the labor market provides limited opportunities for them, which 
means that searching for job longer cannot bring better job offers, while for unemployed 
workers in high-income group, the labor market provides more opportunities, which 
makes it possible to get better job if unemployed workers search for a longer time. Based 
on this assumption, the authors conclude that if UI works efficiently, UI induces the UI 
receivers in high-income group to search longer than UI receivers in the low-income 
group. They use simple OLS regression to check their theoretical result, taking 
unemployment duration as dependant variable and controlling for other demographic 
characteristics, labor market situations and UI. Their empirical result agrees with their 
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theoretical inference, although within low-income and high-income group, UI receivers 
have a longer UD than their counterparts. 
 
The above job search models suggest that it is possible that UI has positive effect on job 
search and reduces UD. Holzer (1988) shows that the number of job search methods used 
to find job is affected by income sources. Wadsworth (1991) shows that mean number of 
search method used by benefits receivers is 3.16 and is only 2.36 by non-benefit receivers. 
If there is a positive correlation between job arrival rate and number of search method, it 
is possible that UI can increase the transition rate of reemployment.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Model 
2.2.1 Mortensen’s Model 
 
Mortensen (1986) mainly focuses on the transition from unemployment to employment. 
According to Mortensen’s model2 at each period, 
 
∫∞ −+−= 0 )(])(,0max[ xdFVxWcbrV λ ,                  (1) 
 
where V is the value of unemployment, r is the interest rate, b-c is the unemployment 
income, and b is the value of leisure, c is the search cost; ∫∞ −0 )(])(,0max[ xdFVxWλ is 
the expected income from job search, λ is job arrival rate, is value of job if 
unemployed workers accept the job offer, and is the distribution of job offers. 
)(xW
)(xF
                                                 
2 The detail is referred to Mortensen (1986). 
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Equation 1 tells that the imputed income derived from the value of unemployment per 
unit time period is equal to the unemployment income plus the expected income gain 
from job search. Since the present value of a future earning stream given a wage equal to 
x is , and the reservation wage is equal to imputed value of unemployment, rxxW /)( =
 
**)( wwrWrV ==                                  (2) 
 
To recover the fundamental reservation wage equation for this model, simply use 
equation 2 to eliminate V in equation 1 and let rxxW /)( = , and the result becomes, 
 
.)(][)/( **
* bwcxdFwxr w −+=−∫∞λ                     (3) 
 
The left-hand side is the expected present value of return from job search and the right-
hand side is the cost of search this period when reservation wage is offered. Therefore, 
the rational policy for search is reached when the benefit of job search is equal to the cost 
of job search. Given a stationary reservation wage, and job arrival rate,*w λ , the 
probability at which unemployed workers escape unemployment is simply 
 
)],(1[ *wF−= λφ                     (4) 
 
which means that the transition rate from unemployment is the product of job arrival rate  
and the possibility of accepting the job offer . )](1[ *wF−
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2.2.2 Extension of Mortensen’s Model 
 
Two assumptions are added into Mortensen’s model. The first assumption is that the job 
arrival rate is positively correlated with search cost and the marginal effect of search cost 
on job arrival rate diminishes with search cost— 0)( and 0)( <′′>′ cc λλ . This assumption 
means the more money inputted into job search, the higher possibility to receive job offer, 
while the marginal effect is diminishing. The second assumption is that unemployed 
workers can decide how much financial resource to put into job search in order to 
maximize their value of unemployment. This assumption makes the search cost 
endogenously decided. Although the second assumption in this paper is the same with 
Ben-Horim and Zuckerman (1987), the first assumption of this paper is different with 
theirs. Ben-Horim and Zuckerman’s model assumes that job distribution changes with 
search cost, while my model assumes that search cost has effect on job arrival rate and 
has no relationship with job offer distribution.  
 
After the two assumptions are introduced, the problem of the transition becomes  
 
∫∞ −+−= 0c )(])(,0max[ s.t.         Max xdFVxWcbrVV λ      (5) 
 
 Equation 2 tells that , which implies that maximizing the value of 
unemployment is equivalent with maximizing the reservation wage. Hence the object 




bwcxdFwxrw w −+=−∫∞ ** **c )(][)/( s.t.    Max λ                   (6) 
 
For convenience, hereafter  denotes . Lagrange function is 
constructed to solve this question, 




+−−+= λθ                  (7) 
 
Use F.O.C.  0/ ,0/ =∂∂=∂∂ θLcL , in addition , which is implied by the 
assumption that there is an optimal search cost to maximize reservation wage. Hence the 
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λ                            (9) 
 
Equation 9 (B) implies that when the return of search is equal to cost of job search, the 
reservation wage is rational. Equation 9 (A) implies when the marginal life-time income 
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return from search is equal to marginal search cost, the rational reservation wage is 
optimized. If the search cost is chosen to maximize the value of unemployment, it must 
fulfill both of the two conditions specified in equation 9. In addition, reservation wage is 
assumed to be a concave function of search cost in this paper. This makes the optimal 
search cost the unique solution of the maximization problem. However, it is very hard to 
determine whether equation 9 has solution or not. In appendix 1, an example is given to 
show the existence of the possible solution. This example verifies that it is possible for 
unemployed worker to choose search cost to maximize their value of unemployment. 
 
Suppose each period $a is available for unemployed workers to support his job search. UI 
receivers receive periodic benefits, $u, over a maximum of N periods. The search strategy 
utilized by an insured person is characterized by a search expenditure policy 
 to maximize the expected value of unemployment, where measures 
the search cost in period n.  The expected UD is determined by the search cost and 
reservation wage. 
),,( 21 KccC = nc
 
The financial resources available to support job search are determined by two parts: one 
is from asset; the other is from social benefits. Individual asset is property net of debt and 
it includes monetary asset, such as bank saving and cash, etc and non-monetary asset, 
such as house or car, etc. Although it is impossible that whole asset is available to be 
utilized to support job search, it is reasonable to assume that the more the asset, the more 
financial resources available to support job search. Hence )(Aν  is used to denote the 
available resource to support job search, where A denotes individual asset and 0>
dA
dν . In 
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order to distinguish the UI receiver and Non-UI receiver, a is assumed to be the financial 
resource from asset. The following equation can be constructed, 
 
)(Aa ν=  .                 (10) 
 




−+=−∫∞≤ ** ** )(][)/( s.t.       Max λ           (11) 
 
Let be the global optimal search cost, which satisfies equation 9. There are two cases 
need to consider: if , which means unemployed workers can afford the optimal 
search cost; if , which means unemployed workers cannot afford optimal job 
search, since it is assumed that reservation wage is a concave function of search cost, the 
feasible optimal search cost will be a. Therefore the feasible optimal search input of 




),min(ˆ * acc =
 
For unemployed workers with UI, the UI benefits can not only be used to support job 
search but also add unemployment income. Hence the strategy can be determined by the 
following strategy:  
 
)()(][)/( s.t.      Max **
** ubwcxdFwxrw wuac
+−+=−∫∞+≤ λ         (12) 
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Suppose is the global optimal search cost. The feasible optimal search cost is #c
),min(~ # uacc +=  
 
Since UI benefits are only available for N period, after UI expiration the problem for UI 
receivers would be the same problem as Non-UI receivers. To examine the impact of UI 
on expected UD, the transition rate of UI receivers and Non-UI receivers during the UI 
period will be compared. UI benefits can affect UD through two channels—reservation 
wage and search cost. 
 
 As to its effect on reservation wage, if UI is taken as part of unemployment income, it 
will increase unemployment income. In addition, UI can be used to support job search, 
which would broaden the boundary of financial resources. These two effects make the 
value of unemployment, or reservation wage for UI receivers lager than for Non-UI 
receivers, that is . Fishe (1982) uses the data obtained from Continuous 




As to UI’s effect on financial resources used for job search, this effect is determined by 
the relationship between and . In the example of appendix 1, the UI benefits are 
taken as the addition of unemployment income and it is inferred that  from the 
example. However, this cannot ensure that in all cases.  Later the effect of UI on 







Equation 4 defines transition rate, or hazard rate which means the 
probability of transition out of unemployment in each period. And the expected UD can 










E ,                 (13) 
 
In order to compare the expected UD between UI receiver and Non-UI receiver, let be 
the transition rate from unemployment to employment and E be the expected UD for the 
Non-UI receiver; let  be the transition rate during the UI benefits period and 
*φ
#φ E  be the 




φ=E                            (14) 
 For UI receiver, 
)11()1(1   
])1)(()1)(([)1(1   
)1()1()1(1   































































And the relationship between EE  and can be compared using the following function, 
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                  ])1(1)[11(         













Obviously, the above function shows that the relationship between E and E  is 
determined by the relationship between #*
1 and 1 φφ . 
 
The impact of UI on expected UD can be discussed with two cases.  
Case 1: , which means that optimal search cost for Non-UI receivers is no less 
than that for UI receivers. For unemployed workers who can afford the optimal search 
cost, i.e. , during the period of UI benefits, reservation wage of UI receiver is 
higher and search cost is lower than their Non-UI counterparts. According 
to , it is clear . Therefore, 
 #* cc ≥
 * ac ≤
)](1[ *wF−= λφ #* φφ > #* 1 1 φφ < and EE > . In this case, UI 
will length the expected UD. For unemployed workers who cannot afford the optimal 
search cost, i.e. , the UI receivers will use the UI benefits to support job search, 
which makes job arrival rate higher than that of their counterpart. Although the 
reservation wage is still higher than that of Non-UI receivers, it is possible that the 
transition rate of UI receiver is larger than that of Non-UI receiver, i.e. . Therefore, 
 * ac >
#* φφ <
#*
1 1 φφ > and EE <  . In addition, the assumption 0)( and 0)( <′′>′ cc λλ  increases such 
possibility. When search cost is low, the marginal effect of search cost is high, which 
makes the positive effect of UI on job arrival rate dominate. 
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In above case, UI reduces expected UD for unemployed workers who cannot afford the 
optimal search cost and increases the UD for those who can afford the search cost. 
Because 0)( >′ Aν , when individual asset is below certain amount, UI decreases UD; 
when individual asset is above that amount, UI increases UD. In the empirical regression, 
an interaction form of individual asset and UI benefits receipt dummy will be used to 
examine whether the impact of UI on transition turns from positive to negative at certain 
amount of individual asset. 
 
Case 2: , which means that optimal search cost for Non-UI receiver is less than for 
UI receiver. For unemployed workers who can afford the optimal search cost, i.e. ,  
the reservation wage of UI receivers is higher than that of Non-UI receivers. And the 
search cost of UI receivers is higher than that of Non-UI receivers. This makes the 
relationship of transition rate between UI and Non-UI receivers ambiguous. For 
unemployed workers who cannot afford the optimal search cost, i.e. , the analysis 
is the same with unemployed workers who cannot afford the optimal search cost in case 1, 
and it is possible that the transition rate of UI receiver is larger than that of Non-UI 
receiver, that is  and 
#* cc <
 * ac ≤
 * ac >
#* φφ < EE < . In this case, UI reduces expected UD for unemployed 
workers who cannot afford the optimal search cost, and the effect of UI on UD is unclear 
for those who can afford the search cost. 
 
In above two cases, case 1 infers that the effect of UI on UD turns from positive to 
negative with the increase of asset; in case 2, the change of the effect of UI on UD is 
unclear. It is possible that the impact of UI changes once as case 1, however the effect of 
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UI on UD may have other patterns. In order to check whether the inference that the effect 
of UI changes once with individual asset is preferred, an interaction form of cubic 
individual asset and UI benefits reception dummy will be used to display the possibility 
that the effect of UI on UD changes three times with individual asset. The empirical 
result will be used to testify which inference is superior. 
 
It is assumed that the value of leisure is positively correlated with asset. The intuition is 
that for unemployed workers with more assets, they can spend more money enjoying 
their leisure happier and this gives them higher value of leisure. As a result, the 
reservation wage will increase with asset, which has been proven by Bloemen and 
Stancanelli (2001). They empirically test the impact of asset on reservation wage and 
verify that asset has a significant and positive impact on the reservation wage. At the 
same time, the individual asset can provide financial support for job search and raise the 
job arrival rate. Hence the impact of asset is ambiguous. However, according 
to 0)( and 0)( <′′>′ cc λλ   , it is quite possible that when individual asset is low, the 
transition rate from unemployment to employment increases with individual asset and 
when individual asset is high, the transition rate decreases with individual asset. In 
empirical regression, quadratic form of individual asset will be used to examine the effect 




 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
The job search model provides researchers with a powerful tool to analyze the problem of 
transition. So many empirical methods are used to check theoretical result. In this paper 
survival analysis is used to investigate the transition from unemployment to employment.  
 
3.1 Hazard Rate Function 
 
Hazard rate is the probability that a person who has been in unemployment for t time 
leaves it in the short interval of length dt  after t, that is )|( tTdttTP ≥+= . Dividing 
this probability by dt  to get the average probability of leaving per unit time, the hazard 












where the relevant circumstances and personal characteristics of unemployed worker who 
has been looking for a job for t weeks are assembled in a vector . The elements of this 
vector include the level of UI benefits, the asset of the individual, and unemployment rate, 




dttx ))((λ  and there is a probability that if such an offer is 




quantity dttxdttxQtx ))(())(())(( φλ = , the probability of a transition out of unemployment. 
And ))(( txφ is the hazard function of transition from unemployment to employment and 
will be used to construct the model to test the derived theoretic result. The hazard rate 
means the probability of transition—even if all relevant were known to the 
investigator he/she still will not be sure whether a transition will occur. Two estimation 
methods are used in this paper, i.e. parametric and semi-parametric estimation, to check 
whether the result is sensitive to the different estimation method. 
)(tx
 
3.2 Parametric Estimation 
 
MLE method is used to estimate the impact of on transition.  is the possibility 
of leaving unemployment at time interval (
)(tx dttk )(
dttt + , ), where is possibility density 
function (PDF) of transition from unemployment to employment; cumulated density 




)(tK is the probability of  remaining unemployed after t period 
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Equation 16 denotes the transition PDF for individual at time t, β is the coefficient 
of . If a sample of n completed spell is available and each individual’s spell is 
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where ),( βtΨ is the joint probability distribution of the sample as a function of β  . When 
a spell is censored at duration , the information known is only that the duration lasts at 




),( βjtK , the probability that the duration is longer than . Let 
if the spell is uncensored, and
jt
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As ∫−= t dtttK 0 )),(exp(),( βφβ  and , after substituting 
them into equation 18, the log-likelihood function can be written in terms of the hazard 
function  
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Equation 19 is the target function to be used to estimate β , the coefficient vector of .  )(tx
 
In order to estimate the coefficients of , the function form of hazard must be specified. 
The proportional hazard function of is often used by previous studies, which says 
that the coefficients of do not change over time.
)(tx
xet βχ )(
x )(tχ is known as baseline hazard 
function. In parametric estimation, the function form of hazard rate must be fully 
specified. The simplest distribution is exponential distribution. In this case, the hazard 
rate is constant , which means that the possibility of reemployment remains the same 
over time. The constant hazard function can be extended to be time-varying, 
which allows the possibility of reemployment to vary with time. This 
kind of distribution of hazard is known as Weibull distribution. Exponential distribution 
is a special case of Weibull distribution when α=1. Another form of proportional hazard 
function is called Gompertz distribution. The baseline hazard is
xeβ
xett βααφ 1)( −=
)exp()exp()( 0βγχ tt = , 
and the baseline hazard varies exponentially with time, hence hazard function 
is )exp()exp()( 0 xtt ββγφ += . 
 
Layte and Callan (2001) use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to choose the hazard 
rate among Complementary Log-log, Weibull and Precise Constant distribution. In this 
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paper, I follow their method to choose the proper hazard rate function with AIC. For 
parametric survival models, the AIC is defined as 
 
(20)                            )(2ln2 ckLAIC ++−=  
 
where Lln is log-likelihood value, k is the number of model covariates and c the number 
of model-specific distributional parameters. The preferred model is the one with the 
lowest AIC value. Results reported in table 1 show that Weibull distribution has the 




Table 1: Comparison of AIC Value for Three Models 
k c AIC Distribution Log Likelihood
Exponential -1479.2538 17 1 2994.508 
Weibull -1466.8809 17 2 2971.762 
Gompertz -1478.7111 17 2 2995.422 
 
Heterogeneity is also an important question to be dealt with. Kiefer (1984) [P.539] says 
“Heterogeneity can arise from left-out regressors, functional from misspecification, or 
unobservable variation in taste. Unless the heterogeneity components are independent of 
repressors, inferences ignoring heterogeneity can be seriously biased”. The most frequent 
way of dealing with heterogeneity is to use the mixing distribution, that is, the density 
function, ),( tk β  changes to )|,( εβ tk , where ε  is heterogeneity component and the 
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distribution of ε  is )(εp . The correct density function for contribution to likelihood 
function is ∫= εεεββ dptktk )()|,(),( . In this paper the commonly used Inverse-
Gaussian distribution is used to control for the distribution of heterogeneity. 
 
3.3 Semi-parametric Estimation 
 
The semi-parametric approach suggested by Cox (1972) can be used to estimate β  in the 
proportional hazard model without specifying the form of the baseline hazard 
function )(tχ . Suppose the completed durations are ordered nttt <<< ...21 . For the 
present suppose there is no censoring and there are no ties in the duration. The 
conditional probability that observation 1 concludes a spell at duration , given that any 
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β , which is the contribution of the shortest duration to the partial likelihood. 















. The likelihood is 
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The intuition here is that, in the absence of all information about the baseline hazard, only 
the order of the durations provides information about the unknown coefficients. 
Censoring is handled in partial likelihood estimation this way: an individual censored 
between duration and  appears in the denominator of log-likelihood of 
observations 1 through j, not in any others. Censored spells do not enter the numerator. 
Ties can be handled by using the same denominator.  
jt 1+jt
 
Equation 21 is more flexible than equation 19, because it does not specify the form of 
)(tχ subjectively. Meyer (1990) uses semi-parameter estimation to investigate the impact 
of UI on UD and concludes the advantage of semi-parametric method compared with 
full-parametric estimation is that semi-parametric estimation avoids inconsistently 
estimating covariate coefficients due to misspecified baseline hazard. In order to see 
whether the result is sensitive to the estimation method, both the Weibull distribution and 






The data used in this paper is the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79 
(NLSY79). NLSY79 records information of the respondents over 20 years. The 
interviewers will periodically ask the same person about his/her work history and 
personal characteristics during the past year. 
 
4.1 Introduction to NLSY79 
 
NLSY79 is administrated by US Department of Labor. NLSY79 has collected data on 
each respondent’s labor force experience, labor market attachment, and investment in 
education and training through 1978 to 2000. In addition, these data contain 
comprehensive information of UI benefits receivers. The NLSY79 is conducted annually 
from 1979 to 1994, biennially after 1994 and consists of three sub samples: (1) A cross-
sectional sample of 6,111 respondents designed to be representative of the non-
institutionalized civilian segment of young people in the United States; (2) A 
supplemental sample of 5,295 respondents designed to oversample civilian Hispanic, 
black, and economically disadvantaged living in the United States; (3) A sample of 1,280 
respondents designed to represent the population who are enlisted in army. 
 
NLSY79 have been extensively used by many researchers. Cameron, Gritz and Macurdy 
(1989) use NLSY79 to explore the impact of UI on UD and find an individual who 
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collects UI compared to one who does not is likely to experience a longer UD. Budd and 
Mccall (1997) use NLSY79 to see the impact of unions on the receipt of UI benefits and 
find that unions have no significant effect on UI take-up among white-collar workers; but 
blue-collar union workers eligible for UI benefits are 23% more likely to be UI receivers 
than are their nonunion counterparts. 
 
4.2 Data Processing  
 
From NLSY79, two kinds of individuals are chosen: unemployed workers without UI and 
unemployed workers with UI, both of whom find job after unemployment. Since only 
year 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 survey contain information on asset 
net of debt for the individual, the data in these years are used in regression. The following 
criteria are used to select sample.  
 
(1) Only the cross-section sample is used to avoid sample bias, which includes 6111 
individuals;  
(2) To minimize the bias that rises from recalling mistakes, individual should attend 2 
consecutive interviews; 
(3) Individual must be at least 18 years old when being interviewed;  
(4) The individual has work experience when he or she attends the interview;  
(5) The individual has not been in regular school since last interview;  
(6) There is no missing value of the variables used in the regression. 
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By requirements (2)–(6), 4978 individuals are collected. Since this paper only examines 
the transition from unemployment to employment, the individuals are deleted from the 
sample if they transit from unemployment to out of labor force. In addition, individuals 
whose UI claim period does not agree with reported unemployment spell is deleted from 
the sample. My final sample consists of totally 1054 individuals—289 UI receivers and 
765 Non-UI receivers. In the sample, many individuals have multiple unemployment 
spells. For the selected individuals with more than one unemployment spell, the 
unemployment spells are combined into one spell if the time between spells is no more 
than 2 weeks because it is too short to be deemed as a successful transition from 
unemployment to employment. Furthermore, for each individual only one unemployment 
spell is used to avoid duration correlation. 
 
4.3 Control Variables  
 
In this paper personal characteristics and labor market circumstances are controlled for. 
The control variables include gender, race, education, work experience, marital status, 
having children or not, local unemployment rate, resident region, individual asset and 
whether individual receives UI.  
 
Dummy variable, male=1 if the respondent is a male and zero otherwise. White=1 if the 
respondent is a white and zero otherwise; black=1 if the respondent is a black and zero 
otherwise, leaving other race as reference group. To control for the past work history, 
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work experience3 and number of weeks in unemployment in past year are used. The 
highest grade certificate (HGC) is used to control for education level. Furthermore Armed 
Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT)4 score is used to control for the ability of individual. 
A dummy variable married=1 if the respondent is married and zero otherwise. Whether 
the individual has children or not is also controlled for in regression. In addition, the 
interaction form of male and children is added to capture the potential impact of children 
on transition of male. To control for the labor demand situation, local unemployment rate 
and the region of residence of the respondent are used. Asset is divided by consumer 
price index (CPI 1990=100) to standardize different year’s asset and is transformed into 
logarithm form. Dummy RECVUI is used to show whether unemployed workers received 
UI; RECVUI=1, if unemployed worker receives UI, otherwise RECVUI=0. To test the 
theoretical result that UI possibly can increase the transition rate for unemployed workers 
with little asset, the interaction term between RECVUI and individual asset is also 
included in the regression. In addition, in order to test whether the effect of asset on UD 
actually acts as theoretically expected, the quadratic form of asset is used in regression. 





                                                 
3 The work experience is computed as exp=Age-Edu-6. 
4The creation of AFQT involves (1) computing a verbal composite score by summing word knowledge and 
paragraph comprehension raw scores; (2) converting subtest raw scores for verbal, math knowledge, and 
arithmetic reasoning; (3) multiplying the verbal standard score by two; (4) summing the standard scores for 


























Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables 















































































































Have Children or not 
(Have children=1, 
does not have children=0) 
 
0.55 0.50 0 1 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.50 
 
Male × Number of Children 0.49 1.00 0 7 0.55 1.02 0.46 0.99 
 
Experience 14.00 4.38 2 28 13.90 4.03 14.03 4.51 
 
Weeks unemployed 


















Highest Grade Certificate 12.90 2.24 0 20 13.04 2.10 12.84 2.29 
 
AFQT 42.54 26.87 1 99 46.96 26.35 40.87 26.89 
 
South 



















Local unemployment rate 6.52 2.85 1.5 16.5 7.01 2.93 6.34 2.80 
 





4.4 Descriptive Duration Analysis 
 
Figure 1 shows Kaplan-Meier hazard5 rate for the whole sample. The transition rate does 























Figure 2 plots the h
to note that hazard
workers without UI
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5 The method of compuFigure 1: Hazard Rate of the Whole Sample Hazard Rate of whole sample 
6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42
Week
azard for both the UI receivers and Non-UI receivers. It is interesting 
 rate of these two groups shows different pattern. For unemployed 
, hazard rate is high at the beginning of unemployment spell and then 
; for unemployed workers with UI, the hazard rate is low initially and 
ployment duration. This tells that the Non-UI receivers try to find a 
ible, while the UI receivers prefer to search longer for better jobs or 
re at the beginning of unemployment spell. Figure 2 shows that after 
                  
ting Kaplan-Meier hazard rate is in appendix 2. 
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about 10 weeks, hazard rate of UI receivers becomes larger than that of Non-UI 
counterpart; the possible reason is that Non UI receivers with high competencies in job 
market have found a job during 10 weeks after they get unemployed, leaving unemployed 
workers for whom it is difficult to find a job. In addition, for the UI receivers, the 
transition rate increases a lot around the 26th week and after that time the hazard rate 
increases all the time until the week 39. This result may be due to the regulation that UI 
benefits expire at the end of 26th week6. The detail of the U.S. regulation of UI is referred 












Figure 2: Hazard Rate of Unemployed Workers with UI and without UI 




















                                                 
6 According to U.S. regulation, if the unemployment rate is very high there will be another 13 weeks 
extended UI. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 RESULT AND EXPLANATIONS 
 
The hazard rate takes the form of and the ratio of hazard for a change 
from to is
βχβφ xetxt )(),,( =
























== . where 
shows the increase in hazard rate to the original if the covariate increases by one 
unite. If
ieβ
0>iβ , the probability of transiting out of unemployment increases with the 
value of , vice versa. Table 3 reports the result. ix
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Table 3: Regression Result of Whole Sample 
Coefficient 









Effect of UI on transition     
  
RECVUI  1.153** 0.776** 0.832** -13.046* 
 (0.372) (0.369) (0.585) (7.497) 
  
RECVUI X Asset -0.169*** -0.110*** -0.118*** 4.629* 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.062) (2.648) 
  
RECVUI X Asset^2 - - - -0.519* 
   (0.304) 
   
RECVUI X Asset^3 - - - 0.018* 
   (0.011) 
Effect of Asset on Transition     
  
Asset 0.344*** 0.392*** 0.551*** 0.449** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.169) (0.176) 
  
Asset ×Asset -0.020*** --0.023*** -0.032*** -0.026** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 












0.063 0.116 0.147 











Male 0.330** 0.220*** 0.247*** 0.339*** 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.131) (0.131) 
  









Male ×Number of Children 0.045 0.054 
(0.045) 
0.078 0.079 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.070) 
Work history     
0.011 0.017 0.010 0.011 
Experience (0.036) (0.036) (0.056) (0.057) 
  
Experience ×Experience -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Weeks of Unemployment in past year -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.062*** -0.063*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
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Equation 1 uses the semi-parametric model, and equation 2 uses the Weibull distribution. 
Although equation 1 and equation 2 use different regression method, the coefficients and 
standard error are very similar between these two equations, which means that the result 
is insensitive to whether the semi-parametric or the Weibull distribution is used. 
Furthermore, equation 3 uses Weibull distribution and inverse-Gaussian heterogeneity 
distribution. A comparison between the results of equation 3, equation 1 and equation 2 
shows that:  
Education and skills   
 
 
    
Highest Grade Certificate 0.007 0.008 
(0.020) 
0.008 0.007 
 (0.02) (0.031) (0.031) 
  
AFQT 0.003* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 




Live in the south 
-0.065 -0.087 -0.139 -0.145 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.104) (0.104) 
  
Local unemployment Rate -0.050*** -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.052*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
Hazard function form Semi-
parameter 
Weibull Weibull Weibull 
 distribution distribution distribution 
 
Yes Control Heterogeneity No No Yes 
     
Number of observation 1054 1054 1054 1054 
  
LR Test 246.09 314.13 326.32 331.18 
 
Pro>Chi^2 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
   
Log likelihood -6195.108  -1466.384 -1405.102 -1402.669 
                  
                   Note: *** represents the significant level at 1% 
                             **   represents the significant level at 5% 
                               *   represents the significant level at 10%
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(1) The sign of the coefficients are the same for all three estimation methods;  
(2) The standard errors estimated using equation 3 are slightly larger than those of 
equation 1 and equation 2. This is probably because that equation 3 controls for the 
heterogeneity;  
(3) The coefficient is a bit larger than that of equation 1 and equation 2, the possible 
reason is that after the heterogeneity is controlled for, the downward bias caused by the 
correlation between covariate and error term is reduced; 
 (4) The significant level of the covariates almost does not change, except that the 
significant level of Male changes from 0.01 to 0.05;  
(5) The log likelihood value increases a lot compared with equation 2.  
 
Based on the result of equation 1, 2, 3, even if the heterogeneity is control for, the result 
almost does not change. Since within equation 2 and 3, the log likelihood value of 
equation 3 is much lager than that of equation 2, which means controlling for the 
heterogeneity improves the regression, the model which uses Weibull distribution as 
hazard rate function and inverse-Gaussian distribution to control for the heterogeneity is 
used to report regression result.  
  
5.1 Impact of UI on UD 
 
The theoretical model of this paper has illustrated two possibilities to show the impact of 
UI on expected UD. In order to test which inference is preferred, one critical value of 
asset is compared with three critical values through empirical result. Equation 3 reports 
37 
Result and Explanations 
the result of one critical value of asset and equation 4 reports the three critical values of 
asset. The log-likelihood rate of equation 4 only improves 2.5 points compared with that 
of equation 3. The reason is that equation 4 has two more variables than equation 3. The 
minor increase of log-likelihood rate tells that adding two more variables almost does not 
improve the result. In equation 4, the new added variables, RECVUI×Asset^2, and 
RECVUI×Asset^3 are significant only at 10% level. In addition, after these two variables 
are added into the regression, the variables, RECVUI and RECVUI×Asset, become less 
significant. All above comparisons show that adding the two variables RECVUI×Asset^2, 
and RECVUI×Asset^3, cannot improve the result. Therefore these two variables should 
not be included in regression model. Based on above analysis, the empirical result prefers 
one critical value of asset to three critical value of asset. Hereafter equation 3 is used to 
report the empirical result. 
 
The turning point where the impact of UI on transition rate turns from positive to 
negative is computed. When log asset is larger than (1.153/0.169), that is 6.839, the 
impact of UI on transition rate becomes negative. Therefore when individual asset is 
over , US$933.59 based on 1990 dollar, UI would induce longer expected UD. It is 
helpful to see the proportion of unemployed workers whose assets are below this critical 
value. The distribution of individual asset is reported in table 4 and US$933.59 accounts 
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Table 4: Distribution of Individual Asset 
Percentiles 
 
Because UI has incentive effect on job search for a small proportion of the population, if 
the whole sample is used and interaction form of UI and personal information is not 
included, it is very hard to find that impact of UI changes with personal characteristics 
and it is easy to conclude that UI has negative effect on reemployment. This explains why 
most previous studies find that UI has negative impact of on transition from 
unemployment to employment. Therefore in order to understand the nature of UI, it is 
improper to use only UI variables, since for different people the impact of UI may be 
different. In addition, besides the effect of UI on the possibility of accepting a wage, the 
impact of UI on job arrival rate should be taken into consideration as well. The empirical 
result supports the result derived from theoretical part and provides a direct example that 
UI can provide financial assistance to help job search. 
5% 10% 12.3% 25% 
Asset 931.15 465.57 904.43 2500 
Percentiles 50% 75% 90% 95% 
Asset 9044.31 33319.73 81216.84 152291.3 
Mean 35787.74 
Standard Deviation  95994.95
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Figure 3: The Impact of UI on UD with Variation of Individual Asset 
Impact of UI 
on transition  
Slope=-0.169 
Log (US$933.59) Log (Asset) 
 
5.2 Impact of Individual Asset on UD 
 
The empirical result agrees with the inference that it is possible that when asset is low, 
the positive effect of asset on transition dominates; when asset is high, the negative effect 
dominates. The coefficients on the quadratic of asset are significant at the 1% level. From 
regression result and032.0−=a 551.0=b , it means that if asset increase one log point, 
the transition will increase 551.0)032.0(2 +−× Asset . This clearly confirms that when 
asset is below a certain amount, the positive impact of asset on transition dominates and 
transition rate increases with asset; when asset is over a certain amount, the negative 
impact of asset on transition dominates and transition rate decreases with asset. It is easy 
to compute the value of critical point, abAsset 2/−= , that is 8.677. Transforming the 
logarithm value into normal value, it is US$5865.15 1990 dollars. Figure 4 shows the 
effect of assets on transition rate. 
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Figure 4: The Impact of Asset on Transition Rate 
Transition  
Rate 
Log (US$5865.15) Log (Asset) 
Marginal impact of 
log asset on 
transition 
Log (US$5865.15) Log (Asset) 
 
 
This figure gives a rough picture of impact of asset on transition and confirms the 
theoretical inference. The results above are a little different from some previous papers. 
Previous researchers often ignore the impact of asset on job arrival rate; some of them 
treat it to be determined exogenously and just set it as constant. Danforth (1979) proves 
that a worker’s reservation wage increases with his asset, but the author does not explore 
the possibility that an individual’s asset may affect his job arrival rate. As a result, he 
infers that the transition rate will decrease with asset monotonically. This paper assumes 
the job arrival rate is positively correlated with search expenditure and finds transition 
rate increases with individual asset for unemployed workers with limited asset and 
41 
Result and Explanations 
decrease with individual asset for the unemployed worker whose asset is above certain 
amount.  
 
5.3 Impact of Other Variables on UD 
 
Besides RECVUI and individual asset, personal characteristics, work history, education 
level and skill, and labor market factors also affect UD. The whites transit out of 
unemployment a little faster than the reference group. An interesting finding is that the 
expected UD of the black is a little shorter than that of the white although this effect is 
insignificant. This may be due to the fact that the blacks are more willing to accept job 
offer if given, while the whites prefer to search a little longer to get better jobs. Married 
individuals leave unemployment a little faster than unmarried. This may be due to their 
heavy family burden compared with the singles and hence they search more intensively. 
The expected UD for males is shorter than for females and this effect is significant at the 
5% level. One possible reason is that because males are usually the bread earner of the 
family, they are more eager to transit out of unemployment to earn money to support their 
families. Unemployed females with children spend more time in unemployment; this may 
be contributed to that the unemployed females with children are willing to spend more 
time caring for their children. However unemployed males with children find job faster, 
because they have to feed the family and children, the heavy family burden forces them 
to find jobs quickly. 
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As to the work history, the transition rate increases with work experience first, then 
decreases with work experience. The turning point is seven years. This may be because 
that after seven years, the human capital accumulation will be a little outdated, which 
makes it harder for these unemployed workers to find a job. Another factor which may 
influence the transition rate is erosion of the skill. It is known that if people do not work 
for a long time, his or her working skill will be eroded. This might be one reason to 
explain why weeks of unemployment in past year, is significant and negative. Another 
possible reason might be their unobserved characteristics, that is, certain unemployed 
workers stay in unemployment longer than others. 
 
In the education and skill part, AFQT is significant and positive, which means that the 
higher AFQT score, the shorter the expected UD. Because AFQT shows the ability of 
individual, it is reasonable to assume the AFQT and job offers is positively correlated and 
this makes unemployed workers with high AFQT score easier to find a job. Similarly, if 
highest grade certificate of unemployed workers is higher, he or she is easier to find job, 
although highest grade certificate is insignificant.  
 
As to labor market factors, region of residence and local unemployment rate are used to 
control for the labor market factors. The region of residence takes negative sign; the 
possible reason is that the labor demand in the south of U.S. is less than in other places. 
And the local unemployment rate has negative and significant impact on transition. When 
the unemployment rate is high, the competition of finding a job is strong and the labor 
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demand is reduced. Consequently it would make unemployed workers stay in 
unemployment longer. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 IMPLICATION AND APPLICATION 
 
The main points of this paper are (1) the impact of UI on expected UD is affected by 
individual asset—when individual asset is below a certain amount, UI can possibly 
reduce the expected UD; when an individual’s asset is above a certain amount, UI will 
increase the expected UD; (2) individual asset does not monotonically increase the 
expected UD, it can provide money to help unemployed workers to search job, which 
causes that when asset is low, the transition rate increases with asset. In this paper, this 
result is derived from theory and checked from empirical regression.  
 
It has been shown that the transition rate is determined by job arrival rate and the 
possibility of accepting job offer. Many researchers only pay attention to the possibility 
of accepting job offer, ignoring the potential effect of job arrival rate on transition rate, 
which will bias the incentive effect of UI and individual asset. In addition, in order to find 
how UI takes effect, it is better not to just use UI variable, such as level of UI benefits 
and UI benefits duration, but to consider the channel through which UI influences UD. 
More researches are needed to consider the channel to understand how UI works. 
 
As to the policy applications, Lancaster and Nickell (1980) say that in order to reduce the 
unemployment rate, the government must cut down the benefits level. This may be a 
method to reduce the unemployment rate. However, it is known that the purposes of UI 
include (1) maintaining the consumption level of people in case of unemployment; (2) 
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helping unemployed workers find a job. If the benefits level is cut down for all UI 
receivers, for those unemployed with limited resources, the consumption level will be 
reduced, which will decrease their welfare a lot. It can be inferred that cutting down 
benefits level for all UI receivers may cause negative effect for unemployed workers with 
limited asset, because unemployed workers with low asset have to stay longer in 
unemployment if the benefits level is reduced. 
 
This paper finds that with the increasing of asset, the disincentive effect of UI becomes 
larger. One application is to tax the high-income UI receivers. Before 1979, 
unemployment insurance was not treated as taxable income in the United States.  Several 
economists criticize this policy on the ground that not taxing UI benefits while taxing 
earnings allegedly encourages unemployed persons to conduct longer than socially 
optimal job search. Since 1979 UI benefits received by persons in higher-income families 
have been subject to income tax. Solon (1985) investigates whether the introduction of 
benefits taxation has the predicted effect of reducing unemployment duration. His study 
uses data on a sample of persons that files for UI in 1978 or 1979 to examine whether 
high-income receivers collect benefits for shorter periods after the tax changes than they 
do before benefits becomes taxable. His paper presents persuasive evidence of tax effect 
on unemployment duration. The 1979 policy change is estimated to have reduced average 
unemployment duration among the sampled high-income receivers by about one week. 
However, there are not many measures taken for the UI receivers who are poor. It is 
suggested that the government give other kinds of subsidy to unemployed workers to help 






This paper extends Mortensen’s model by relaxing two assumptions: one is that job 
arrival rate is positively correlated with search cost; the other is that the search cost is 
endogenously determined by unemployed workers to maximize value of unemployment. 
As a result, the model shows that unemployed workers will choose an optimal search cost 
according to their financial constraint.  
 
I find that for unemployed workers whose available financial resources are below the 
optimal search cost, UI benefits can support their job search and hence reduce the 
expected UD. However, for unemployed workers who can afford the optimal search cost, 
the impact of UI benefits is ambiguous. I also find it is possible that when individual asset 
is below certain amount, transition rate increases with asset and when individual asset is 
above this amount, transition rate decreases with asset.  
 
I use the data extracted from U.S. NLSY79. After the personal characteristics and labor 
market situations are controlled for, the empirical model tests two alternative cases of the 
impact of UI on expected UD, i.e. one critical value and three critical values of asset. The 
empirical result prefer one critical value of asset and finds that UI reduces the expected 
UD if individual asset is below US$933.59 based on 1990’s dollars, which accounts for 
12.4% individuals of the sample, and increases the expected UD if individual asset is 
above that amount. Furthermore it is also found that when individual asset is below 
47 
Conclusion 
US$5865.15 based on 1990’s dollars, the transition rate increases with asset; when 
individual asset is above this amount, the transition rate decreases with asset.  
 
The empirical model uses the semi-parametric and parametric survival analysis and 
empirical results are stable across different estimation method even if the heterogeneity is 
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 AN EXAMPLE TO SHOW THE EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL SEARCH COST 
 
A.1 The Solution of Optimal Search Cost 
 
Equation 9 lists the conditions for the optimal search cost. Here an example is used to 
show that there possibly exists an optimal search cost. Suppose the job offer distribution 










In addition, assume that the job arrival rate , which agrees with 
that
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0)( and 0)( ,10 <′′>′<≤ cc λλλ . According to equation 9, the solution is from the 
following function group, 
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From function (i),  
 
                                                 
7 The distribution of job offer and function form of job arrival rate are cited from Moshe Ben-Horim and 
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Substitute equation A1.2 to the equation (ii) of equation group A1.1,  
 
1−−+= cbew c                                   (A1.3) 
 
Substitute equation A1.3 back into A1.2,  
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It is very hard to explicitly express the solution of optimal search cost, a figure will be 
drawn to show whether the solution exists. Let )(cϕ denote the left-hand side of equation 
A1.4, that is, , then 2)1()( −−−+= cAbec cϕ
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As , . In order to determine the sign of0≥c 01≥−ce )(cϕ′ , the sign 
of , or equivalently must be determined. If A>b, 
it can be found that the sign of is negative when c is below certain 
amount, suppose  satisfies  and the sign becomes positive when 
c is above  . Totally, 
)1( −−−+ cAbec )]}(1[{ bAcec −++−
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1c )(cϕ′ firstly is negative when 1cc < and then positive when .  1cc >
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From figure A1 it is clear that if  the optimal search cost does exist. 
Numerical method can be used to compute the value of and then the optimal 
reservation wage or the maximized value of unemployment can be got. 
ArbA 2)( 2 >− *c
*c
 
Figure A1 The solution of optimal search cost
 
 
A.2 The Effect of UI Benefits on Optimal Search Cost 
 
Using this example, the optimal search cost in case of UI benefits can be determined. UI 
benefits are taken as part of value of leisure-that is, b changes to b+u. Hence the 
curve )(cϕ shifts down, causing the optimal search cost to decrease.  
cAre2 (  2)bA −
)(cϕ
2Ar 
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 Appendix 2 
COMPUTATION METHOD OF EMRIRICAL HAZARD RATE 
 
Let  be the number of spells neither completed nor censored before duration . Let 
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 The hazard  is the probability of completing a spell at duration , conditional upon 
the spells reaching duration . A natural estimator for  
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UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS SYSTEM OF UNITED STATES 
 
In United States, UI is the main form of unemployment benefits for unemployed people. 
It is a compulsory insurance system. Employees of firms in industry and commerce and 
employees of nonprofit organizations with 4 or more employees during 20 weeks in a 
year are covered by UI. Almost all State and local government workers, domestics, and 
2/5 of farm workers are also covered. Some agricultural employees, employees of 
religious organizations, casual employees, family labor, and self-employed are excluded 
from access to UI. Special Federal programs for railroad employees, Federal employees, 
and ex-service persons are also set up in other laws. 
 
A worker’s monetary benefits rights are based on his or her employment in covered work 
over a prior period, called the “base period”, and these benefit rights remain fixed for a 
“benefit year”. In most States the base period is the four quarters of the last five 
completed calendar quarters before the claim of UI. About 3/4 of States require minimum 
earnings in preceding base year equal to specified multiple of weekly benefit or high-
quarter wages, or to specified total amount. Eight States require a specified number of 
weeks of employment (e.g., 15-20 weeks) (minimum number of hours in one state), 





In addition, all States require that for claimants to receive benefits, they must be able to 
work and must be available for work, that is, they must be in the labor force and their 
unemployment must be due to lack of work. One kind of evidence of ability to work is 
filling of claims and registration for work at States agencies, also the unemployed worker 
is required to make an independent job-seeking effort. Most states also have special 
disqualification provisions. Unemployment due to voluntary leaving, misconduct, labor 
dispute, or refusal of suitable offer (length of disqualification varies among States) will 
not be covered by UI. 
 
Under all states laws, the amount payable for a week of total unemployment varies with 
the worker’s past wages within minimum and maximum limits. In most of the states, the 
formula is designed to compensate for a fraction of the usual weekly wage (normally 
about 50%), subject to specified dollar maximums. All states pay the full weekly benefits 
amount when a claimant has some work during the week, but has earned less than a 
specified ( relatively small) sum. In the majority of states, this amount is defined as a 
wage that is earned in a week of less than full-time work and that is less than the 
claimant’s regular weekly benefit amount. All states also provide for the payment of 
reduced weekly benefits, partial payment, when earnings exceed that specified amount. 
Twelve states and the District of Columbia provide additional allowance for certain 
dependants. They all include children under specified ages (16, 18, or 19 and generally, 
older if incapacitated); nine states provide for a nonworking spouse; and three states 




Most states require a waiting period of one week before benefits can begin. All but two 
states set a statutory maximum of 26 weeks of benefits in a benefits year. In addition, 
most states vary the duration of benefits through formulas that relate potential duration to 
the amount of former earnings or employment.  
 
In the 1970’s, a permanent Federal-State program of extended benefits was established 
for workers who exhaust their entitlement to regular benefits during high unemployment. 
Once the extended benefit is triggered, Federal law provides up to 13 additional weeks in 
States with high unemployment. The federal law requires that the claimant applying for 
extended benefits must have 20 weeks in full-time employment (or equivalent in insured 
wages) and must meet special work requirement.  
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